With the wide adoption of cloud computing paradigm, it is important to develop appropriate techniques to protect client data privacy in the cloud. Encryption is one of the major techniques that could be used to achieve this gaol. However, data encryption at the rest along is insufficient for secure cloud computation environments. Further effiicent techniques for carrying out computation over encrypted data are also required. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and garbled circuits are naturally used to process encrypted data without leaking any information about the data. However, existing FHE schemes are inefficient for processing large amount of data in cloud and garbled circuits are one time programs and cannot be reused. Using modern technologies such as FHE, several authors have developed reusable garbled circuit techniques in recent years. But they are not efficient either and could not be deployed at a large scale. By relaxing the privacy definition from perfect forward secrecy to all-or-nothing privacy, we are able to design efficient reusable garbled circuits in this paper. These reusable garbled computation techniques could be used for processing encrypted cloud data efficiently.
Introduction
Cloud computing techniques become pervasive and users begin to store their private encrypted data in cloud services. In order to take full advantage of the cloud computing paradigm, it is important to design efficient techniques to protect client data privacy in the cloud. From a first look, encryption at rest seems to be a feasible solution to address these challenges. Lots of companies are trying hard to secure cloud data with encryption techniques. But a truly optimal solution is still far from us since encryption is not a good or even an acceptable solution for cloud data storage. If encryption at rest is the only solution, then the functionality of cloud computing is limited to: encrypt data at the user's location, transmit encrypted data to the cloud, and then bring the data back to the user's location for decryption before being used locally. This is against one of the cloud computing paradigms "moving computation is cheaper than moving data" (see, e.g., [5] ). Indeed, in many scenarios, it is less expensive to store data locally than in the cloud. So using the cloud for data-storage without the capability of processing these data remotely may not be an economic approach.
This shows the importance of developing techniques for processing encrypted data at the cloud without downloading them to the local site. A natural solution is to use garbled computing techniques such as garbled circuits or fully homomorphic encryption schemes. Yao [25] introduced the garbled circuit concept which allows computing a function f on an input x without leaking any information about the input x or the circuit used for the computation of f (x). Since then, garbled circuit based protocols have been used in numerous places and it has become one of the fundamental components of secure multi-party computation protocols. Garbled circuit techniques could be further developed as one of the potential techniques allowing computation over encrypted cloud data. However, there are two disadvantages in Yao's approach. Firstly, Yao's garbled circuit is not reusable. Secondly, using a garbled circuit to evaluate an algorithm on encrypted data takes the worst-case runtime of the algorithm on all inputs of the same length since Turing machines are simulated by circuits via unrolling loops to their worst-case runtime, and via considering all branches of a computation.
It has been an open question for 30 years of designing reusable garbled circuits and reusable garbled RAMs or Turing machines. Recently, Goldwasser et al [14] and Garg et al [8] (see also Brakerski and Rothblum [6] , Barak et al [1] , and Pass et al [21] ) constructed reusable garbled circuits by using techniques of computing on encrypted data such as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes by Gentry [11] , and attributebased encryption (ABE) schemes for arbitrary circuits by Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan and Wee [15] and Sahai and Waters [9] . Goldwasser et al [13] also constructed reusable garbled Turing machines by employing techniques of FHE, witness encryption (WE) schemes by Garg et el [10] , and the existence of SNARKs (Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge) by Bitansky et al [4] . However, both of the current reusable garbling schemes for circuits and Turing machines in Goldwasser et al [13, 14] and Garg et al [8] are inefficient unless there would be a breakthrough in improving the efficiency of FHE implementations dramatically. Under current FHE implementation techniques, it is more efficient to use Yao's one-time garbled circuits than to use the garbling schemes in [8, 13, 14] .
In Goldwasser et al's garbling scheme [13, 14] , the owner of a circuit C encrypts the circuit C using an ideal cipher (e.g., AES) and gives a copy of this encrypted circuitC = E.Enc(sk, C) to the evaluator. Each time when the circuit owner wants the evaluator to calculate C(x), the circuit owner creates a homomorphic encryption scheme public key hpk and a corresponding private key hsk. Using the newly created public key hpk, the circuit owner calculates the homomorphic encryption cipher texts c for the input bits x and key bits sk bit by bit and constructs a Yao's one-time garbled circuit D for decrypting the homomorphic encryption scheme by integrating the private key hsk within D. The circuit owner gives (D, c) to the evaluator. The evaluator uses a universal circuit to homomorphically decrypt the circuit C from E.Enc(sk, C) and then runs C on the input x homomorphically. After the evaluation, the evaluator obtains the homomorphic encryption ciphertext E hpk (C(x)) of C(x). In order for the evaluator to decrypt E hpk (C(x)), the circuit owner uses an attribute based encryption scheme to send corresponding labels for the garbled circuit D so that the evaluator will be able to decrypt E hpk (C(x)) to C(x). It is easy to show that these garbled circuits are reusable since the only published circuit is the universal circuit which contains no information about the protected circuit C which is encrypted using a secure symmetric encryption scheme. Though [13, 14] give an affirmative answer to the reusable garbled circuit open problem, it is still open to design efficient reusable garbled circuits. The schemes in Goldwasser et al [13, 14] are inefficient from two aspects: expensive homomorphic encryption schemes are used for the input encryption and there is a slow process of integrating the universal circuit and the FHE bootstrapping operations into the ABE ciphertexts.
The main performance cost for FHE is due to the fact that all existing FHE schemes are based on "noisy" encryption schemes where homomorphic operations increase the noise in ciphertexts. For example, Goldwasser et al's solution [14] is based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem. After a homomorphic operation (e.g., a circuit gate evaluation) is performed on the ciphertexts, Gentry's [11] bootstrapping technique is used to refresh the ciphertexts by homomorphically computing the decryption function on encrypted secret key, and bringing the noise of the ciphertexts back to acceptable levels. The bootstrapping operation is the main bottleneck in FHE implementation due to the complexity of homomorphic decryption. Recently, Halevi and Shoup [16] reported a bootstrapping algorithm that takes 30 minutes to re-encrypt a single-bit ciphertext. More recently, Halevi and Shoup [17] reported a re-encryption procedure under 5.5 minutes (for a security level of 76 bits). By performing an additional single bit operation before bootstrapping, Ducas and Micciancio [7] reported some fast algorithms for bootstrapping NAND gate though it is not clear whether it can be extended to other circuit gate types.
The above discussion shows the motivation for designing practical reusable garbled circuits without the use of FHE schemes. For Yao's one-time garbled circuits, the security of input and circuit privacy has been studied by several authors such as Lindell and Pinkas [20] and Bellare, Hoand, and Rogaway [3] . However, the privacy requirement for reusable garbled circuits and reusable garbled Turing machines has not been fully understood yet. In Goldwasser et al's work [13, 14] , the simulation based privacy definition requires perfect forward secrecy. That is, the leakage of one input x will not leak any information about other inputs y = x. This kind of perfect for-ward secrecy is standard in most cryptographic protocol designs. However, it may be unnecessarily strong for reusable garbled circuits/Turing machine applications. In this paper, we consider all-or-nothing privacy with reusability for reusable garbled circuits and reusable garbled Turing machines. By all-or-nothing privacy with reusability, we mean that if the circuit/Turing machine owner does not disclose any individual input x (in plaintext) on which the garbled circuit/Turing machine has evaluated, then zero information about other inputs (on which the garbled circuit/Turing machine has evaluated) is leaked. However, if the circuit/Turing machine owner discloses any input x on which the garbled circuit/Turing machine has evaluated, then the values of all other inputs (on which the garbled circuit/Turing machine has evaluated) will be leaked. Under this security definition of all-or-nothing privacy with reusability, this paper shows the following results without using FHE schemes:
1. There exists an efficient universal circuit U C such that for any circuit C, U C (C,x) outputs C(x) whereC = E.Enc(sk,C),x = E.Enc(sk,x), and E is an ideal cipher. We conclude this section with some notations. Unless specified otherwise, we will use q = 2 m and our discussions will be based on the field GF (q) throughout this paper. Bold face low case letters such as a, b, c, d, e, f , g are used to denote row or column vectors over GF (q). It should be clear from the context whether a specific bold face letter represents a row or column vector. For a string x ∈ GF (q) n , we use x[i] to denote the ith element of x. That is,
We use x ∈ R GF (q) to denote that x is randomly chosen from GF (q) with the uniform distribution. We use κ to denote the security parameter, p(·) to denote a function p that takes one input, and p(·, ·) to denote a function p that takes two inputs. A function f is said to be negligible in an input parameter κ if for all d > 0, there exists K such that for all κ > K, f (κ) < κ −d . For convenience, we write f (κ) = negl(κ). Two ensembles, X = {X κ } κ∈N and Y = {Y κ } κ∈N , are said to be computationally indistinguishable if for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D, we have
Throughout the paper, we use probabilistic experiments and denote their outputs using random variables. For example, Exp real E,A (1 κ ) represents the output of the real experiment for scheme E with adversary A on security parameter κ.
Random linear code based garbled circuits
We first briefly review Yao's garbled circuit design. In the process of garbling a circuit, two keys are assigned to each wire. Each gate with two inputs is represented by four ciphertexts. Table 1 provides a garbled representation of an AND gate with input (x, y) and output z. As an example, if the input is (x, y) = (1, 0), then the circuit owner sends keys k 1 x and k 0 y to the evaluator. Using these keys, the evaluator could decrypt the key k 0 z for the output wire, which corresponds to the output 0. Lindell and Pinkas [20] formally showed that Yao's garbled circuit protocol is secure against semi-honest (or passive) adversaries. It is straightforward to check that Yao's garbled circuits could not be used to evaluate the underlying function on two different inputs. 
In this section, we show how to use random linear codes to garble a circuit. This technique will be used for the design of reusable garbled circuits in Section 3. Note that efficient circuit and input private reusable garbled circuits could be directly designed using random input permutation defined in Section 3.2. However, by using the random linear code based approach, we could collect some useful information about the circuit evaluation and these information may be useful in the design of secure revealing schemes of Section 3.2. If this kind of information collection is not necessary, it is recommended to use a random input permutation instead of a random linear code for a reusable garbled circuit design. A random input permutation based reusable garbled circuit is as efficient as the original un-garbled circuit.
Random linear codes and an example of garbling a gate
n . Equivalently, a linear code is a linear space generated by the k rows of a rank k matrix G ∈ GF (q) k×n as C = {xG : x ∈ GF (q) k }. In coding theory, linear codes are normally used for errorcorrection purpose. For example, for a k-length message x ∈ GF (q) k , one can send an n-length message y = xG to the receiver. If the received message y = y, the receiver may recover the original code y (equivalently the original message x) in case the Hamming weight of y − y is smaller than d/2, where d ≤ n − k + 1 is the code distance. For well-known linear codes such as Reed-Solomon codes and Goppa codes, there are efficient decoding algorithms to recover the original message from a corrupt message. However, if the generator matrix G is randomly selected, then it is NP-hard to recover the original message from the received corrupt message. Based on the hardness of decoding a random linear code, several public key encryption schemes have been proposed. For example, Wang [23] recently introduced a random linear code based public encryption scheme as a post-quantum cryptographic technique. In order to illustrate our techniques of garbling circuits using random linear codes, we first use a concrete example to show how to garble a single gate.
Assume that the client has a single gate (either an AND gate or an OR gate) function f . That is, if f is the AND gate, then f (x, y) = 1 iff both x = 1 and y = 1 while if f is the OR gate, then f (x, y) = 1 iff either x = 1 or y = 1. The client wants to outsource the evaluation of f to the cloud. That is, the client wants to submit a garbled versioñ f to the cloud so that the client can submit garbled input bitsx andỹ to the cloud in future. The cloud would returnc =f (x,ỹ) to the client. The client can recover the value of f (x, y) fromc. The privacy requirement is that the cloud would not learn any thing about x, y, and would not learn whether f is an AND gate or an OR gate.
Let q = 19, k = 2, η = 4, and n = 17. In order to garble the gate function f , the client carries out the following procedures. First let G = 1 0 0 12 15 7 9 11 3 0 6 2 1 7 7 4 10 0 1 2 6 3 4 12 13 16 15 15 11 14 2 7 9 3 be a 2 × 17 linear code generator matrix and A be the following randomly selected non-singular 17 × 17 matrix over GF (19) 
where H f,0 is a 17 × 2 matrix with rows 5 to 17 being zero rows and GH f,0 = 0. Now assume that the gate function f is AND. Then the garbled functionf = (b f , a f,0 , a f,1 , a f,2 , a f,3 ) that the client would outsource to the cloud server consists of the following entries with a f,0 , a f,1 , a f,2 , a f,3 being a randomly permutation of a f,0 , a f,1 , a f,2 , a f,3 : [16, 13, 16, 11 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] T , 2. a f,0 = (r f G − e x,0 − e y,0 + e z,0 + e f )A, 3. a f,1 = (r f G − e x,0 − e y,1 + e z,0 + e f )A, 4. a f,2 = (r f G − e x,1 − e y,0 + e z,0 + e f )A, 5. a f,3 = (r f G − e x,1 − e y,1 + e z,1 + e f )A. In case that the gate function f is OR, then the values of a f,0 , a f,1 , a f,2 , a f,3 are defined as follows:
In a summary, the cloud holds the garbled versionf
) of the gate function f . Without loss of generality, we may assume that the gate function f =AND. Now assume that the client has an input x = 0, y = 1 and wants the cloud to help to calculate f (x, y) = 0. The client needs to submit garbled inputx,ỹ as follows. and letsx = (r x G + e x,0 + e s )Ã y = (r y G + e y,1 + e s )A After receivingx andỹ, the cloud checks which of (x +ỹ + a f,i )b f = 0 for i ≤ 3. The cloud returns i to the client. Using the secret permutation table, the client finds the value j ≤ 3 such that a f,i = a f,j . Since x = 0, y = 1, the only non-zero elements in H f,0 c f are the first four elements, and H f,0 = 0, it is straightforward that
That is, j = 1. Since a f,1 has the component e z,0 , the client learns that f (x, y) = 0.
Garbling a single gate π
In this section, we show how to garble a single AND gate using random linear code based techniques. Let n, k, η be integers with n/4 ≥ η > k. The values of n, k, η are determined by the given security parameter κ. Let G = [g 0 , · · · , g n−1 ] be a k × n generator matrix for an [n, k] linear code. In our construction, we do not require the linear code to have an efficient decoding algorithm though it may be useful to require the existence of such algorithms for certain applications. Let A ∈ R GF (q) n×n be an n × n random dense nonsingular matrix. Choose random row vectors k
z will be used as labels for the input/output wires x, y, z of the AND gate π respectively. Let e x,i , e y,i , e z,i , e π ∈ GF (q) n be row vectors defined by
Furthermore, choose a random row vector r π ∈ R GF (q) k , a random dense column vector c π ∈ R GF (q) η−k , and define the following values:
and H π,0 is an n × (η − k) matrix whose only non-zero rows are those jth rows such that e x,i [j] = 0 or e y,i [j] = 0. That is, the only nonzero rows of H π,0 are the first η rows. Furthermore, the first η rows of H π,0 form a full rank matrix. In other words, the first η rows of H π,0 is a rank η − k parity check matrix for the generator matrix [g 0 , · · · , g η−1 ]. Then the garbled gate π can be described by a column vector b π and a randomly ordered tuple (a π,0 , a π,1 , a π,2 , a π,3 ) of row vectors, where 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 is a permutation of 0, 1, 2, 3. Evaluation of a garbled gate π. Let i x , i y ∈ {0, 1} be the given input to the circuit. The circuit owner chooses random row vectors r x , r y ∈ GF (q) k , and k s ∈ R GF (q) η , sets
encodes the input as c x = (r x G + e x,ix + e s )A and c y = (r y G + e y,iy + e s )A and gives (c x , c y ) to the evaluator. For each i = 0, · · · , 3, the evaluator checks whether
The actual output of the garbled gate is calculated using a one-time garbled circuit implementing a secure revealing scheme using c x + c y + a π,i . The details are presented in Section 3.2.
We first show the correctness of the garbled AND gate evaluation.
Theorem 2.1. Let i xy = 1 if a π,i = a π,3 and i xy = 0 otherwise. For randomly
Proof. By the definition, we have
The only non-zero rows of H π,0 are the first η rows and c π is randomly selected. Thus if the equation (3) takes value 0, then, for appropriately chosen parameters n, η, k, the row vector (e x,ix + e y,iy + a π,i ) is a zero vector with probability 1 − negl(κ). In other words, we have a π,i = −e x,ix − e y,iy . The theorem is proved.
2 The initial security analysis is done with the following two aspects: the information leaked from the garbled circuit description itself and the information leaked from the evaluation of the circuit on multiple inputs. The following theorems show that the privacy of the gate type and the privacy of each input are unconditionally protected after the evaluation of the garbled gate on multiple different inputs.
Theorem 2.2. For a randomly selected gate π ∈ R {AND, OR}, letπ = (b π ; a π,0 , a π,1 , a π,2 , a π,3 ) be the garbled version of π as described above. Then for all probabilistic algorithm D (not necessarily polynomial time) that is used to guess the gate type of π fromπ, we have
where the probability is taken over the randomness used to select the gate π, to construct the garbled gate, and the internal randomness of D.
Proof. First we note that the description of a garbled gateπ includes a column vector b π and row vectors (a π,0 , a π,1 , a π,2 , a π,3 ). If there exists an algorithm D for which the equation (4) does not hold, then D could be converted to an algorithm to predict with a non-negligible probability whether e z,0 is contained three times or one time within the row vectors (a π,0 , a π,1 , a π,2 , a π,3 ).
The column vector c π is randomly chosen for the garbled gate construction. By analyzing values in the row vectors (a π,0 , a π,1 , a π,2 , a π,3 ), the only conclusion that one can get is that e z,0 could be contained in each of the row vectors with an equal probability. The other information that one could use is the column vector b π in the garbled gate description. One may multiply a π,i with b π to obtain the values a i = a π,i · b π . By the fact that the only non-zero rows in H π,0 are the first η rows, we have
That is, a i contains no information about e z,0 . In a summary, from the garbled gate descriptionπ itself, it is not possible to determine whether e z,0 is contained one time or three times within the row vectors (a π,0 , a π,1 , a π,2 , a π,3 ). This contradicts the existence of the algorithm D for which the equation (4) fails. The theorem is proved. 2 Theorem 2.2 shows that the gate type of π is not revealed in the garbled description of the gate. The next theorem shows that the gate type of π is not revealed after multiple runs of the garbled gate on multiple inputs. Theorem 2.3. For a randomly selected gate π ∈ R {AND, OR}, letπ = (b π ; a π,0 , a π,1 , a π,2 , a π,3 ) be the garbled version of π. Assume that the garbled gateπ is executed t times with the following inputs
without revealing the actual outputs. Then for all probabilistic algorithm D (not necessarily polynomial time) that is used to guess the gate type of π under the view of (view t ,π), we have
where the probability is taken over the randomness used to select the gate π, to construct the garbled gate, to code the inputs view t , and the internal randomness of D. Note that we have no bounds on t which could be exponential in the security parameter κ.
Proof. Compared to Theorem 2.2, the additional information that the algorithm D receives is view t in (6) . Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.2, it is sufficient to show that this additional information contains no information about e z,0 .
First, one may multiply these input row vectors in view t with the column vector b π to obtain the values c xi = c xi · b π and c yi = c yi · b π . By the choice of b π , it is straightforward that for i = 0, · · · , t−1, we have c xi = e x,ji,x ·b π and c yi = e y,ji,y ·b π where j i,x , j iy = 0, 1. Thus these values contain no information of e z,0 .
Secondly, for each garbled input (c xj , c yj ), one obtains the garbled gate output c xj + c yj + a π,i . Since the un-garbled output value corresponding to c xj + c yj + a π,i is not revealed, one cannot determine the value of a π,i (thus e z,i ) within this garbled output. Note that for the column vector b π , it contains a matrix H π,0 whose ηth to (n − 1)th rows are zero vectors. Thus it could not be used to determined whether c xj + c yj + a π,i contains e z,0 or not. In a summary, no information about e z,0 is revealed in the new view view t and the theorem is proved.
2
By the proof of Theorem 2.3, for each input (c xi , c yi ), one can compute both c xi = c xi · b π = e x,ji,x · b π and c yi = c yi · b π = e y,ji,y · b π where j i,x , j iy = 0, 1. Thus for two encoded inputs (c x0 , c y0 ) and (c x1 , c y1 ). If the circuit owner discloses the value of (x 0 , y 0 ), then one can easily compute the value of (x 1 , y 1 ) by checking whether c x0 = c x1 and c y0 = c y1 . In other words, the leakage of one input value will lead to the leakage of all input values. This information further helps the adversary to determine the garbled gate type. Our garbling scheme address this challenge by using a semantically secure cipher to encrypt the input. The circuit contains a built-in component to decrypt the input before the actual computation. Since same plaintexts are encrypted to indistinguishable different cipher texts for different sessions, the above informaiton leakage would leak zero information about the inputs.
Furthermore, if the un-garbled gate output values corresponding to c xj +c yj +a π,i are revealed for multiple inputs and the garbled gate has been evaluated on all of the four different input combinations, then one can count the number of 1-output of the garbled gate to determine the gate type.
Theorem 2.4. For a randomly selected gate π ∈ R {AND, OR}, letπ = (b π ; a π,0 , a π,1 , a π,2 , a π,3 ) be the garbled version of π. Assume that the garbled gateπ is executed t times with the inputs from (6) without revealing the un-garbled outputs. Then for all probabilistic algorithm D (not necessarily polynomial time) that is used to guess the value of x 0 under the view of (view t ,π), we have
where the probability is taken over the randomness used to select the gate π, to construct the garbled gate, to code the inputs view t , and the internal randomness of D.
Note that we have no bounds on t which could be exponential in the security parameter κ.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2.3 and the above discussions since an algorithm D for which (8) fails could be used to construct an algorithm D for which (4) fails. 2
Garbling the circuit "(A ∨ B) ∧ (C ∨ B)"
In order to extend the gate garbling technique in Section 2.2 to general circuits, we show how to garble a depth d = 2 circuit "(A ∨ B) ∧ (C ∨ B)" in Figure 1 . It is straightforward to extend the construction to other circuits with appropriately adjusted security parameters. In our discussion, we will abuse our notations by using the gate name to refer to the corresponding output wire of the gate also. For example, in Figure  1 , we will use F to refer to the gate C ∨B or to the output wire of this gate or, alternatively, to the input wire for the gate G = D ∧ F .
In our construction, we assume that there is no negative gate since each negative variable can be integrated into the description of the immediate next gate. For example, in the circuit of Figure 1 , we can combine both the gate E = B and the gate F into one single gate. In other words, the impact of negating a variable is reflected in the garbling description of the immediate next gate. As in Section 2.2, let n, k, η be integers with n/4 > η > k, which are determined by the given security parameter κ.
η with i = 0, 1, and three random
of length n zero vectors in the same way as in equation (1). In order to make the garbled circuit evaluation possible, we need to put labels for input wires and output wire of each gate in separate blocks of the length n row vectors. We have put the labels for input variables A, B, C in the first block [0, η − 1]. Thus we can put labels k The garbled gates D, F, G are defined in the same way as in Section 2.2 with the following customization:
• For gate F , we need to take into consideration the impact of the negative gate E on its input wire.
• For the garbled gate G, the column vector b G is generated using an n × (η − k) matrix H G,0 whose only non-zero rows are those jth rows with η ≤ j < 2η − 1. As an example, we show the description for the garbled gate F . Define the following values:
c F is a column vector of length n, where GH F,0 = 0 n×(η−k) and H F,0 is an n × (η − k) matrix whose only non-zero rows are those jth rows with j < η. Furthermore, the first η rows of H F,0 form a full rank matrix. Then garbled gate F can be described by a column vector b F and a randomly ordered tuple (a F,0 , a F,1 , a F,2 , a F,3 (2), encodes the input as
and gives (c A , c B , c C ) to the evaluator. The evaluator evaluates the circuit gate by gate beginning from the input wires A, B, C in the same way as described in Section 2.2 until obtain the garbled circuit output a G,i + x of the gate G for some x ∈ GF (q) n and i = 0, 1, 2, 3. Similarly, the actual output of the garbled circuit is calculated using a one-time garbled circuit implementing a secure revealing scheme using a G,i + x. The details are presented in Section 3.2.
It is straightforward to see that the security analysis in Theorems 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 of Section 2.2 for a single garbled gate hold for an entire garbled circuit also under the view of garbled circuit evaluations with multiple inputs. The details are omitted here. We only present a combined version of Theorems 2.3 and 2.4 in the following for the circuit.
Theorem 2.5. For a randomly selected circuit Π with input wires (x 0 , · · · , x ν−1 ), let Π be the garbled version of Π. Assume that the garbled circuitΠ is executed t times with the following garbled inputs
without revealing the actual outputs. Then for all probabilistic algorithm D 0 (not necessarily polynomial time) that is used to guess the gate type of any specific gate π ∈ Π under the view of (view t ,Π), and all probabilistic algorithm D 1 (not necessarily polynomial time) that is used to guess the value of a randomly selected x i under the view of (view t ,Π), we have
and
where the probability is taken over the randomness used to select the circuit Π, to construct the garbled circuit Π, to code the inputs view t , to select the gate π, to select the input bit x i , and the internal randomness of D. Note that we have no bounds on t which could be exponential in the security parameter κ.
Proof. It follows from proofs of Theorems 2.3 and 2.4 in Section 2.2 and the observation that each gate π within the circuit Π is garbled independently. Thus any garbled gate of the circuit will not reveal any information of other garbled gates. 
Reusable garbled circuits
In Section 2, we constructed reusable garbled circuits by only revealing the encoded circuit output. In practice, we often need to reveal the actual circuit output to the evaluator. This could be achieved using Yao's one-time circuits.
One-time garbled circuits
In this section, we briefly review the formal definition of one-time garbled circuits by Yao [25] . Our definition is based on Bellare, Hoand, and Rogaway [3] . Definition 3.1. Let C = {C ν } ν∈N be a family of circuits such that C ν is a set of boolean circuits that take ν-bit inputs. A garbling scheme for C is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms GC = (GC.Garble, GC.Enc, GC.Eval) with the following properties
• (Υ, sk) = GC.Garble(1 κ , C) outputs a garbled circuit Υ and a secret key sk for circuits C ∈ C ν on the security parameter input κ.
• c = GC.Enc(sk, x) outputs an encoding c for an input x ∈ {0, 1} * .
• y = GC.Eval(Υ, c) outputs a value y which should equal to C(x) on the input c = GC.Enc(sk, x) and the garbled circuit Υ of C. The garbling scheme GC is correct if we have
P rob[GC.Eval(Υ, c) = C(x)|GC] = negl(κ).
The garbling scheme GC is efficient if the size of Υ is bounded by a polynomial and the run-time of c = GC.Enc(sk, x) is also bounded by a polynomial.
For a garbled circuit, some side-information such as the number of inputs, outputs, gates, the topology of the circuits (that is, the connection of gates but not gate types) and other information is leaked inherently. We denote such kind of side information as Φ(C). The following security definition of garbling schemes captures the intuition that the adversary learns no information except Φ(C) about the circuit and input given one evaluation of the garbled circuit. Definition 3.2. (Privacy for one-time garbling schemes) A garbling scheme GC for a family of circuits C is said to be input and circuit private if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator Sim GC such that for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A and D and all large κ, we have
where Φ(C) is the inherent information leaked to the adversary and REAL and SIM are the following events
Secure revealing schemes
Without loss of generality, we may assume that the universal circuit U C have onebit outputs throughout this paper. In a high level informal description, a revealing box is a black box map from ν-bit binary strings to one bit: {0, 1} ν → {0, 1}. The revealing box owner announces two labels for each input bit without disclosing which label corresponds to 0 or 1. The adversary can observe that labeled inputs go into the black box and a single bit output (0 or 1) comes out of the black box. The adversary is not allowed to submit inputs to the black box and does not know what are the actual inputs corresponding to these input labels. After the adversary observes some evaluations of the black box, it tries to predict which label corresponds to 0 and which label corresponds to 1. We say that the revealing box is secure if the probability for the adversary to succeed is negligible.
First we give a definition for an input permutation.
Definition 3.3. Let a 0,0 , a 0,1 , · · · , a ν−1,0 , a n−1,1 be a list of 2ν symbols such that a i,0 = a i,1 for i = 0, · · · , ν − 1. An input permutation µ for a binary input string of length ν is a set of ν maps µ = (µ 0 , · · · , µ ν−1 ) with the property that µ i : {a i,0 , a i,1 } → {0, 1} is a bijective map for each i = 0, · · · , ν − 1.
Note that in the above definition, one may simply use a i,0 = 0 and a i,1 = 1 for i = 0, · · · , ν − 1 to save the bandwidth. In the following, we give a definition for secure revealing schemes.
Definition 3.4. Let C = {C ν } ν∈N be a family of circuits such that C ν is a set of boolean circuits that take ν-bit inputs. A revealing scheme for C is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms Rev = (Rev.Setup, Rev.Perm, Rev.Enc, Rev.Eval, GC) with the following properties (where GC is a Yao's one-time garbling scheme):
• symSet = Rev.Setup(1 κ , C) outputs a symbol set symSet = {a 0,0 , a 0,1 , · · ·, a ν−1,0 , a ν−1,1 }.
• µ = Rev.Perm(symSet) outputs an input permutation µ.
• c = Rev.Enc(µ, x) outputs an encoding c = (c 0 , · · · , c ν−1 ) of x such that
• y = Rev.Eval(κ, C, c, µ, GC) which consists of the following steps 1. (C, sk) = GC.Garble(1 κ , C). 2. cC = GC.Enc(sk, µ(c)).
y = GC.Eval(C, cC) outputs a value which should equal to C(x).
The following definition of secure revealing schemes captures the intuition that for any revealing scheme or input chosen by the adversary, one can simulate the revealing scheme and the encoding based on the output from the revealing scheme in polynomial time (assume that the input permutation symbol set is available to the simulator, but the simulator has no access to the input permutation map µ). 
is an oracle that on input x from A 1 , runs S 1 with inputs C(x), 1 |x| , symSet, and the latest state of S; it returns the output of S 1 (storing the new simulator state for the next invocation). The revealing scheme Rev is said to be secure if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator S such that for all pairs of probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A = (A 0 , A 1 ), the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
Now we informally describe the process of designing reusable garbled circuits. For each evaluation of C(x), the circuit owner encodes x into a garbled inputx = φ(E.Enc(sk,x)) to U C and creates a Yao's one time garbled circuitD to decrypt the outputȳ = φ(E.Enc(sk,C(x))). At the same time, the circuit owner uses an attribute based encryption scheme for U C to encrypt the corresponding labels forD into a cipher text c abe . The circuit owner gives (x,D, c abe ) to the evaluator. When the evaluator receives (x,D, c abe ), it uses U C ,x, and c abe to decrypt labels forD corresponding toȳ = φ(E.Enc(sk,C(x))). The evaluator then runsD onȳ to obtain C(x). Our assumption is that the ideal cipher decryption circuit D can be implemented as a secure revealing scheme D. Note that this assumption is reasonable by assuming the semantic security of the underlying encryption scheme.
Two-outcome attribute-based encryption scheme
We briefly review the definition of two-outcome attribute-based encryption (ABE 2 ) scheme and its security definition by Goldwasser et al [14] . Definition 3.6. A two-outcome attribute-based encryption scheme ABE 2 for a class of predicate circuits P, represented as boolean circuits with ν input bits and one output bit, is a tuple of four algorithms (ABE 2 .Setup, ABE 2 .Enc, ABE 2 .KeyGen, ABE 2 .Dec):
• (mpk, msk) = ABE 2 .Setup(1 κ ): On the security parameter input 1 κ , the setup algorithm outputs the master public key mpk and the master secret key msk.
• sk P = ABE 2 .KeyGen(msk, P ): On input msk and a predicate specified by P ∈ P, the key generation algorithm outputs a secret key sk P corresponding to P . Note that P is public.
• c = ABE 2 .Enc(mpk, x, b 0 , b 1 ): On input the master public key mpk, an attribute x ∈ {0, 1} * , and two messages b 0 , b 1 , the encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext c.
• b i = ABE 2 .Dec(sk P , c): On input a secret key sk P for the predicate P and a ciphertext c, the decryption algorithm outputs b i if P (x) = i for i = 0, 1.
The correctness of an ABE 2 scheme means that ABE 2 .Dec(sk P , c) fails with a negligible probability (for a formal definition of correctness, it is referred to [14] ). Intuitively, the security of an ABE 2 scheme means that if one has the secret key sk P for a predicate P , then one can decrypt one of the two encrypted messages based on the value of P (x) where x is the attribute, but learns zero information about the other message. Formally, the security can be defined as follows.
Definition 3.7. (Goldwasser et al [14] ) Let ABE 2 be a two-outcome attribute-based encryption scheme for a class of predicates P. Let A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) be a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time adversaries. Define the following experiment Exp ABE2 (1 κ ):
Choose a random bit b and let c = ABE 2 .Enc(mpk, x, a, a b ), if P (x) = 0, ABE 2 .Enc(mpk, x, a b , a), otherwise.
6. b = A 3 (state 2 , c). If b = b , P ∈ P, |a 0 |= |a 1 |, and x ∈ {0, 1} * , then output 1. Otherwise, output 0. The scheme is said to be a single-key fully-secure two-outcome ABE 2 if for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A and for all sufficiently large security parameters κ, we have
The scheme is said to be single-key selectively secure if A needs to provide x before receiving mpk.
Reusable garbled circuits
The syntax and efficiency of reusable garbling schemes RGC = (RGC.Garble, RGC.Enc, RGC.Eval) remain the same as that for one-time garbling schemes GC but with some semantic changes (details could be found in Section 3.5). Before we move on to our security definition of reusable garbled circuits, we want to point out one essential difference between our garbled circuit privacy and circuit obfuscation security. For a circuit obfuscation scheme (see, e.g., Barak [2] , Goldwasser and Kalai [12] , and Wee [24] ), the circuit owner gives an obfuscated circuit to the evaluator, and the evaluator can run the obfuscated circuit on any plain text inputs at his choice. On the other hand, for a circuit garbling scheme, the circuit owner gives a garbled circuit to the evaluator, the evaluator can only run the garbled circuit on encrypted inputs that are provided by the circuit owner. Thus the construction of reusable garbled circuits is exempt from the impossibility results for circuit obfuscation research.
The following definition of private reusable garbled circuit scheme captures the intuition that for any circuit or input chosen by the adversary, one can simulate the garbled circuit and the encoding based on the computation result in polynomial time (assume that the input permutation symbol set for the reusable garbled circuit is observed and learned by the simulator). 
where viewEnc = RGC.Enc(sk,·) is a list of encodings for a list of inputs x 0 , · · ·,
is an oracle that on input x from A 1 , runs S 1 with inputs 1 |x| , viewEnc, C(x), and the latest state of S; it returns the output of S 1 (storing the new simulator state for the next invocation). The garbling scheme RGC is said to be circuit and input private with reusability if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator S such that for all pairs of probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A = (A 0 , A 1 ), the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
It should be noted that the major difference between our circuit and input privacy definition and Goldwasser et al's privacy definition is that, in our definition, the simulator has access to viewEnc which contains coding pattern for observed input bits from multiple evaluation of the garbled circuits. Thus if the value of x is disclosed after the evaluation of C(x), then one may be able to calculate other input values y on which C has been evaluated.
The construction of reusable garbled circuits
In the following, we present the construction of a reusable garbled circuit for a circuit C. First we need to notice that the original circuit C is revised in such a way that C decrypts an encrypted input E.Enc(sk i , x) before computing C(x). After the compuation is done, C needs to encrypt the output C(x) as E.Enc(sk o , C(x)) with anohter secret key sk o . The construction of RGC = (RGC.Garble, RGC.Enc, RGC.Eval) for a circuit C proceeds as follows.
(sk, Γ) = RGC.Garble(1 κ , C): • Let sk i = E.KeyGen(κ) and sk o = E.KeyGen(κ). Revise C in such a way that C takes encrypted inputs E.Enc(sk i , x) instead of plaintext inputs x. C first decrypts the encrypted input E.Enc(sk i , x) before computing C(x). After the compuation is done, C encrypts C(x) as a garbled output E.Enc(sk o , C(x)).
• Generate parameters n, k, η for the random linear code based garbling process.
• Use the random linear code based garbling process to generate a linear code garbled circuit C for C.
• Let e i,j for i = 0, · · · , ν − 1, j = 0, 1 be the length n row vectors used for garbling the ν inputs to C and G, A be the matrices used for the gate garbling.
• Let λ = λ(κ) be the length of garbled outputs E.Enc(sk o , C(x)) of C under the security parameter κ.
• Let C i (·) be the ith bit of the garbled output of running C on an encoded garbled input.
• Run ABE 2 .KeyGen(msk, ·) for each C i (·) under msk i to construct secret keys:
Let gsk = (gsk 0 , · · · , gsk λ−1 ).
• Output Γ = (gsk, C) as the reusable garbled circuit and sk = (mpk, e i,j , G, A, sk i , sk o ) as the secret key. c = RGC.Enc(sk, x):
• Let D C be a decryption circuit D C (y) = E.Dec(sk o , y) where y = E.Enc(sk o , C(x)).
• For an input x, first computex = E.Enc(sk i , x), then compute garbled input c x forx using the random linear code based garbling process with sk.
• Run Yao's one-time garbled circuit generation algorithm to produce a garbled circuit Λ: {0, 1} λ → {0, 1} together with 2λ labels L b i for i < λ and b ∈ {0, 1}.
• Produce ABE 2 ciphertexts c 0 , · · · , c λ−1 as follows:
• Output the cipher texts c = (c x , Λ, c 0 , · · · , c λ−1 ). C(x) = RGC.Eval(Γ, c):
• Run ABE 2 decryption algorithm on ciphertexts c 0 , · · ·, c λ−1 to calculate the labels for Yao's garbled circuit Λ:
• Evaluate the garbled circuit Λ with labels L di i to compute the output C(x)
The correctness and efficiency for reusable garbled circuits in Section 3.5 are straightforward. In the following, we show that the scheme in Section 3.5 is circuit and input private with reusability in the sense of Definition 3.8.
Proof of security
In order to prove that privacy is preserved, we need to construct a simulator S = (S 0 , S 1 ) such that (14) holds. In the RGC.Garble process, garbled version C of C is generated and S 0 has access to C but S 0 has no access to secret = (e i,j , G, A).
To generate a simulated garbled circuitΓ = (g sk, C), S 0 runs the following procedures:
1. Generate fresh mpk and msk as in RGC.Garble process. 2. Run ABE 2 .KeyGen(msk, ·) to generate the garbled circuitΓ = (g sk, C). S 1 next constructs a simulated input permutationμ j (b) = z j,b for j = 0, · · · , ν − 1 and b = 0, 1 with z j,0 , z j,1 defined as follows. Let c x0 , · · · , c xt 0 −1 be the observed input encodings from viewEnc and c xi = (c xi,0 , · · · , c xi,ν−1 ) for i = 0, · · · , t 0 − 1. For each j = 0, · · · , ν − 1, let z j,0 , z j,1 ∈ R GF (q) n be two row vectors randomly selected from observed encodings c x0,j , · · · , c xt 0 −1,j with the following properties:
• Let π ∈ C be a garbled gate that takes x[j] as one of its input and let b π be the column vector associated with π.
• Choose z j,0 , z j,1 in such a way that z j,0 · b π = z j,1 · b π if possible. During the simulation, S 1 receives the latest simulator's state, 1 |x| , C, viewEnc, and a circuit output C(x) for some input x without seeing the value of x. S 1 needs to output a simulated encodingc = (c x ,Λ,c 0 , · · · ,c λ−1 ) for the RGC.Eval process.
S 1 then uses the following procedures to produce a simulated encodingc x without knowing the value of x.
1. Let π 0 , · · · , π w−1 be a list of garbled gates in C, and let b π0 , · · · , b πw−1 be the corresponding columns vectors associated with these garbled gate descriptions. 2. Using Gaussian elimination techniques, randomly select ν row vectors r j ∈ GF (q) n such that r j · b πi = 0 for all j = 0, · · · , ν − 1 and i = 0, · · · , w − 1. Note that this is possible since any linear combinations of rows of the matrix GA could be the potential candidate for r j though S 1 does not know the values of G and A. 3. Let x j = z j,bj + r j for j = 0, · · · , ν − 1, and b j ∈ R {0, 1}. 4. S 1 outputsc x = (x 0 , · · · , x ν−1 ) as the simulated encoding of x. Next, S 1 needs to generate λ simulated ABE 2 ciphertextsc 0 , · · ·,c λ−1 and a simulated one-time garbled circuitΛ. Let Sim GC be the simulator from Definition 3.2 for Yao's one-time garbling scheme. Run Sim GC to produce a simulated garbled circuitΛ for the circuit D C together with the simulated encoding consisting of λ labelsL i for i = 0, · · · , λ − 1. That is, we have
S 1 can invoke the above simulation since it knows C(x) and the output size of C. S 1 can then produce the simulated ABE 2 ciphertextsc 0 , · · · ,c λ−1 as follows:
Note that we used the labelL i for two times. In a summary, S 1 can now output the simulated encoding (c x ,Λ,c 0 , · · · ,c λ−1 ). Now it suffices to show that the simulation satisfies Definition 3.8 for any adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 ). Without loss of generality, we may assume that A 1 output α equals to its entire view. That is, all information that A 1 has received during the protocol run. Note that if we could prove that the real and ideal experiment outputs are computationally indistinguishable with this kind of output, it will be computationally indistinguishable with any other kind of outputs since A 1 is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. That is, any output should be probabilistic polynomial time computable from this view. In the following, we define four games first. Game 0: The ideal game Exp ideal RGC,A,S (1 κ ) of Definition 3.8 with simulator S. The output distribution for this game is:
Game 1: The same as Game 0 except that the simulated input encodingc xi is replaced with the actual encoding c xi of x i by encoding x i using secret. Note that we keep c xi unchanged within the ABE 2 .Enc procedure. That is, the output distribution for this game is:
Game 2: The same as Game 1 except the simulated garbled circuitΛ is replaced with the real garbled circuit Λ.
The output distribution for this game is: 
We prove that the outputs of each pair of games are computationally indistinguishable in the following lemmas. This implies that the distributions in (14) are computationally indistinguishable. Thus our reusable garbled circuits are circuit and input private with reusability.
Lemma 3.9. Assume that the ideal cipher E is semantically secure. Then the outputs of Game 0 and Game 1 are computationally indistinguishable. Proof (sketch). The proof is by contradiction as in the proof of Lemma 3.9. Assume that there exist probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and a probabilistic polynomial time distinguisher D such that D (armed with A) can distinguish the outputs of Game 1 and Game 2 with a non-negligible probability. Then one can build a probabilistic polynomial time distinguisher D 1 to distinguish the outputs of the simulator Sim GC and GC.Garble. This contradicts Definition 3.2. The details for the construction of D 1 are omitted here. 2 Lemma 3.12. Assume that the ABE 2 scheme is secure in the sense of Definition 3.7. Then the outputs of Game 2 and Game 3 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof (sketch). The proof is by contradiction as in the proofs of Lemmas 3.9 and 3.11. Assume that there exist probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and a probabilistic polynomial time distinguisher D such that D (armed with A) can distinguish the outputs of Game 2 and Game 3 with a non-negligible probability. Then one can build a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) such that
This contradicts Definition 3.7. The details for the construction of A are omitted here. 2 Combining Lemmas 3.9, 3.11, and 3.12, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.13. Let C = {C ν } ν∈N be a given circuit family. assume that the one-time garbling scheme is secure, the ideal cipher decryption cicuit could be implemented as a secure revealing scheme, and the ABE 2 scheme is secure. Then the reusable garbling scheme in Section 3.5 is circuit and input private with reusability in the sense of Definition 3.8.
Proof. This follows from Lemmas 3.9, 3.11, and 3.12. 
Discussion and comparison
In this section, we first show that our relaxed security requirement is sufficient for various cloud applications such as those that the cloud does not need to learn the garbled program evaluation output. We then carry out a detailed comparison on the performance of our scheme against Goldwasser et al's scheme [14] .
In most cloud computing applications, the client stores partial data in the cloud server (encrypted according to the secure cloud computation protocol). The client also has a garbled programf that is stored in the cloud server. Each time, when the client runs the garbled program at the cloud server, it submits some garbled inputs to the cloud server. The relaxed security in our protocol shows that if one of these submitted garbled inputs are leaked, the other inputs are leaked also. However, this kind of privacy leakage could be easily addressed in most applications by an additional layer of semantic secure encryption scheme as follows. In the revised protocol, the actual inputs are encrypted using a semantic secure encryption scheme E.Enc such as the padded AES. That is, each input bit x is padded with a randomly selected 127 bits r and the resulting string x|r is encrypted using a secret AES key key. The garbled functionf needs to decrypt the encrypted inputs first before it computes the actual function f . By this additional layer of encryption, the "input" to the garbled functioñ f is the ciphertext c = E.Enc(key, x|r) instead of the original input x. In other words, with the all-or-nothing privacy leakage, if one of the ciphertext c is leaked, the cloud server would learn all other ciphertexts. But from these ciphertexts, the cloud server would still learn nothing about the actual input x since the scheme E.Enc is semantically secure. In other words, we have converted the all-or-nothing security property to a semantically security property. This kind of conversion is possible when the cloud does not need to learn the actual output of the function evaluation. In other words, if the cloud does not need to learn the actual output (which covers most applications in cloud environments), then our all-or-nothing security is equivalent to the traditional semantic security for garbled computation.
In the following, we show the performance advantages of our scheme against Goldwasser et al's scheme [14] . We should remind the reader that the performance advantage of our scheme comes from the relaxed security requirements in our scheme. These relaxed security requirements may not be sufficient for some applications. The inefficiency in [14] comes from the following three aspects:
• For each evaluation of the circuit C on an input x, the circuit owner needs to construct a fully homomorphic encryption scheme to encrypt each bit of x and then the circuit evaluation is done on the homomorphic encryption ciphertexts. This is quite inefficient with existing fully homomorphic encryption schemes.
• The efficiency of current attribute based encryption schemes for general circuits depends on the depth of the circuits. For example, the constructions for ABE in Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan and Wee [15] and Sahai and Waters [9] depends on the circuit depth. In Goldwasser et al's scheme [14] , if the circuit to be garbled is of depth d, then the attribute based encryption scheme is constructed for the circuit U FHE , where U FHE is the universal circuit U with the fully homomorphic encryption scheme's bootstrapping process inserted after each gate of U . The depth of U FHE is poly(d) for some quite large polynomial. Thus there is significant slow down in the ABE scheme.
• In Goldwasser et al's scheme [14] , for each evaluation of the circuit C on an input x, the circuit owner needs to construct a Yao's one-time garbled decryption circuit for the fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Thus if the circuit C is not as complicated as the fully homomorphic decryption circuit, then there is no need to use Goldwasser et al's scheme since, for each evaluation of the circuit C for an input x, one can just simply send a fresh Yao's one-time garbled circuit for C. As a comparison, the garbling scheme proposed in this section enjoys the following advantages.
• The garbling scheme proposed in this section does not use homomorphic encryption schemes. In the proposed scheme, each input bit is represented as a length n row vector and only matrix multiplications are used for the encoding. • For the garbling scheme proposed in this paper, the attribute based encryption scheme ABE 2 is constructed for a depth σ · d circuit C where σ is a constant and d is the depth of the circuit C to be garbled. In other words, instead of using a universal circuit combined with FHE bootstrapping circuits, we use a circuit of depth σ · d which is a significant improvement of efficiency. • In the garbling scheme proposed in this paper, for each evaluation of the circuit C on an input x, the circuit owner only needs to construct a Yao's one-time garbled circuit for D C which is at most as complex as the circuit of a point function or a parity function. Thus it is significantly simpler than the circuit for a fully homomorphic decryption scheme. Furthermore, D C is a small component of the target circuit C. Thus our scheme is more efficient than presenting a fresh one-time garbled circuit of C for each evaluation on an input x. We conclude this section with a performance comparison using the AES encryption/decryption function f AES , which is the dream example in the program obfuscation domain. In order to implement Goldwasser et al's [14] reusable garbling scheme for f AES , one needs to construct a universal circuit U for all depth 16 circuits 3 . U reads an AES encrypted circuit and homomorphically decrypts the circuit using an AES decryption circuit integrated in U . The best reported homomorphic AES decryption algorithm is estimated to take 30 minutes for a decryption of one block (that is, 128-bits) by using packing techniques and some AES-specific optimizations (see [17] for details). Thus if E.Enc(sk, f AES ) is about 40,000-bits 4 , then it takes U at least 6.5 days to decrypt the circuit for f AES . The best reported circuit for f AES by Kreuter, Shelat, and Shen [19] contains 30,728 gates. The best known universal circuit (see, e.g., [18, 22] ) for circuits of size m contains min{19m log m, 1.5m log 2 m} gates. Thus the universal circuit for f AES contains at least 2, 619, 966 gates. Normally, we need to do a bootstrapping operation after at most five gate evaluation on the ciphertexts (see, e.g., Halevi and Shoup [17] ). Using the best existing algorithm from Halevi and Shoup [17] where each bootstrapping takes 5.5 minutes, the homomorphic evaluation of f AES on one single input x takes around 5.5 years. Note that after 5.5 years of evaluation for f AES , we only achieve 76-bit security instead of 128 bit security for the AES scheme since the reported algorithm in Halevi and Shoup [17] is for a 76-bit security strength.
At the same time, for each evaluation f AES of a Goldwasser et al's garbled circuit, a Yao's one-time garbled circuit for the FHE decryption scheme is constructed and given to the evaluator. A very conservative estimate is that an FHE decryption circuit will contain at least 60, 000 circuit gates (existing FHE decryption circuits contain much more circuit gates than this number), whose universal circuit contains at least 5, 447, 092 gates. Assume that every 5 homomorphic evaluation of circuit gates requires a bootstrapping operation. Using Halevi and Shoup's [17] best existing algorithm, the FHE decryption takes 11.4 years to finish. In a summary, the reusable garbled circuit for f AES in Goldwasser et al's [14] takes at least 11.4 + 5.5 = 16.9 years to carry out one evaluation and the achieved security is 76-bits.
In our random linear code based scheme, each gate evaluation is converted to four vector inner product calculations (c x + c y + a π,i )b π of vector length n. That is, each garbled gate could be evaluated with 4n multiplications over the field GF (q). For the function f AES with 80-bit security, the security parameters could be taken as n = 1100, k = 230, η = 240, q = 2 10 (see Wang [23] for details). As we have mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the f AES circuit together with FHE decryption circuit contains around 5, 447, 092 + 2, 619, 966 = 8, 067, 058 gates. In other words, the garbled f AES could be evaluated with 8, 067, 058 × 4 × 1100 = 35495055200 ∼ 2 35 multiplications over the field GF (2 10 ). This can be done on a modern Desktop computer within minutes. Note that it takes around 16.9 years to evaluate f AES using the scheme in Goldwasser et al's [14] .
In a summary, our random linear code based garbling scheme could be practically deployed in case the relaxed security requirement all-or-nothing privacy leakage is sufficient for the application. 
